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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear this appeal 
is embodied in Article VIII, section 9 of the Constitution of 
the State of Utah and codified in U.C.A. 78-2-2 (3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue presented to this Court is whether real property 
and proceeds thereof, transferred by John A. Cavanaugh and 
Violet P. Cavanaugh, at the commencing of this litigation, into 
the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust, is now subject to the judgment 
lien of the appellant, Gordon D Walker. 
The specific real property is a 16 unit apartment complex 
located at 130 East Avenue 42, in Los Angeles, California. This 
property was sold by the Cavanaugh's Chapter 7 Bankruptcy 
Trustee, Mr. Dennis McGoldrick, the substituted plaintiff 
herein. The cash proceeds of the sale are being held by Mr. 
McGoldrick pending the outcome of this appeal. If the Walker 
judgment lien did attach to the real property transferred to the 
Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust, then Walker is a secured creditor 
with a priority to the proceeds of the sale of the apartment 
complex. If Walker's judgment lien did not so attach, because 
the real property was lawfully placed in the Cavanaugh Trust, 
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then Walker is an unsecured creditor with no priority to the 
cash proceeds. 
The standard of review is whether an error of law was 
committed when the District Court failed to invalidate the 
Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust and allow Appellant Walker, a 
legitimate judgment creditor, to execute on the real property 
transferred to the Trust. 
APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
At the time of the District Court's Decision in this 
matter, Utah Code Annotated 25-1-1, et. seq. (1953) as amended, 
"Fraudulent Conveyances" was applicable. Appellants rely on the 
following four sections of this Fraudulent Conveyance Statute 
in this appeal: 
Section 25-1-4: "Conveyances by insolvent. Every 
conveyance made, and every obligation incurred, by a person 
which is, or will be thereby rendered, insolvent is fraudulent 
as to creditors, without regard to his actual intent, if the 
conveyance is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair 
consideration." 
Section 25-1-6: "Conveyances by persons about to incur 
debts. Every conveyance made and every obligation incurred, 
without fair consideration, when the person making the 
conveyance or entering into the obligation intends to, or 
believes that he will, incur debts beyond his ability to pay as 
they mature, is fraudulent as to both present and future 
creditors." 
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Section 25-1-7: "Conveyance to hinder, delay, defraud 
creditors. Every conveyance made, and every obligation incurred, 
with actual intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in 
law, to hinder, delay or defraud either present or future 
creditors is fraudulent as to both present and future 
creditors." 
Section 25-1-11: "Trust for Grantor void. All deeds, 
gifts, conveyances, transfers or assignments verbal or written, 
of goods, chattel, or things in action made in trust for the use 
of the person making the same shall be void as against the 
existing or subsequent creditors of such person." 
These four sections of the code were repealed by the 
Legislative session of 1988 and replaced by Utah's adoption of 
the "Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act." The Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act did not apply retroactively but became effective on 
April 25, 1988, six weeks after the Final Order which is the 
subject of this appeal. Appellant relies on The Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act in this brief for argumentative purposes 
only. Section 25-6-5 is attached as Addendum D hereto. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case was tried before a jury during the week of May 
19, 1987. The jury found for the defendant, Gordon D. Walker, 
who had counterclaims against the plaintiffs, John and Violet 
Cavanaugh. A judgment was entered in Walkers favor in the sum of 
$836,446.97. 
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At the commencing of the litigation in the District Court, 
the plaintiffs, John and Violet Cavanaugh, transferred all their 
assets into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust. After the jury 
verdict, and when it became known that the assets of the 
Cavanaugh7s had been transferred into a Trust, Walker sought to 
void the Trust so that he could collect on his judgment. 
The Honorable John A. Rokich invalidated the Violet P. 
Cavanaugh Trust so far as the personal property contained in the 
Trust was concerned. However, on the basis of Geary v. Cain, 9 
P. 2nd 396 (Utah 1932), Judge Rokich held that the Violet P. 
Cavanaugh Trust was valid as to the real property and that 
Walker could not execute on the apartment complex transferred 
into the Trust. It is this portion of Judge Rokich7s decision 
that appellants seek to have reversed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This action commenced on February 26, 1985, when the 
plaintiff Cavanaughs filed a complaint against the defendant 
Gordon D. Walker in the Third Judicial District Court. On the 
10th day of April, 1986, Gordon D. Walker filed a complaint 
against Cavanaughs seeking foreclosure and collection on a 
promissory note. The action of the Cavanaughs filed in February 
1985 and the action of Gordon D. Walker filed in April 1986 were 
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consolidated into one action by a Court Order on the 22nd day of 
April 1986. Walker was thereafter designated as the counter-
claimant. 
During the week of May 19, 1987, a trial by Jury between 
the parties took place and a judgment in the sum of $836,446.97 
along with a Decree of foreclosure was thereupon entered in 
favor of Gordon D. Walker and against both John and Violet 
Cavanaugh. (R-339). After obtaining judgment, Walker learned 
that the Cavanaugh7s real property assets had been transferred 
by Mr. and Mrs. Cavanaugh into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust on 
April 10, 1986, the same day that Walker commenced his legal 
action against the Cavanaughs.. (R-452, par-2). In fact, all the 
real and personal property assets of Cavanaughs were transferred 
into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust. (R-408). 
Immediately upon obtaining judgment against Cavanaughs, 
Walker recorded a lien on the apartment complex owned by 
Cavanaughs in Los Angeles. (Addendum C, page 6). On June 12, 
1987, Cavanaughs sought to protect their equity in the apartment 
complex by placing eight separate Trust Deeds on the property 
with insiders named as beneficiaries. The total principal sum of 
these Trust Deeds exceeds $220,000. (Addendum C, page 7 and 8). 
On the 6th day of August 1987, a Deficiency Judgment was 
entered in favor of Gordon D. Walker and against Cavanaughs in 
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the sum of $779,537.74. (R-372). On September 17, 1987, a 
Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings was issued and 
subsequently heard on November 13, 1987, before Judge Rokich. 
(R-375 and R-380). The purpose of the supplemental proceeding 
was to invalidate the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust and enable 
Gordon D. Walker to collect his deficiency judgment against the 
assets of the Cavanaughs now being held in the Violet P. 
Cavanaugh Trust. (R-376 and 405). Mr. and Mrs. Cavanaugh 
testified at the supplemental proceeding and were cross-examined 
concerning the creation of the Trust and its assets. (R-380). 
Judge Rokich thereafter issued a Memorandum Decision only 
partially invalidating the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust. (R-388). 
Judge Rokich ruled that the personal property transferred into 
trust could be attached by Walker's judgment, however, he went 
on to rule that the real property transferred into trust could 
not so be attached. (R-388 and R-476). 
The Memorandum Decision of Judge Rokich, dated February 16, 
1988, contains the following nine findings of fact: 
"The court found the facts to be as follows; 
1. No consideration was given to Mrs. Cavanaugh for the 
transfer of the Trust assets into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust. 
2. The Trust property of the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust has 
been treated no differently after the transfer into the Trust 
than it was before. 
- 9 -
3. Mrs, Cavanaugh retains full control over the trust 
property, including the right to modify, amend or revoke the 
Trust at any time. 
4. Mrs. Cavanaugh has the full and complete enjoyment and 
benefit of the Trust property for the duration of her life. 
5. Mrs. Cavanaugh may transfer the Trust property at any 
time for any purpose. 
6. Mrs. Cavanaugh is the beneficiary of all Trust property 
and proceeds. 
7. The alleged sole purpose for the Trust was to provide 
for tax benefits. 
8. At present, Violet P. Cavanaugh is the sole Trustee and 
will remain so for the duration of her life. 
9. A true and correct copy of the Trust is attached hereto, 
and the Trust itself substantiates the above representation." 
(R-339). [Copy of Trust omitted, but located at R-407) 
The entire Memorandum Decision of Judge Rokich is attached 
hereto as addendum A. This Memorandum Decision was entered as a 
final Order on March 16, 1988 and a copy of the Order is 
attached hereto as addendum B. (Memorandum Decision at R-388 
and Order at R-476). 
When Walker commenced collection of his judgment by 
garnishment and attachment of personal property assets, 
Cavanaughs immediately filed bankruptcy in The United States 
Bankruptcy Court, Central District Of California. (Notice of 
Bankruptcy filed with Utah Supreme Court on or about July 11, 
1988). The Chapter 7 Trustee, Dennis McGoldrick, took 
possession of all the assets of the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust, 
- 10 -
including the real property. Mr. McGoldrick, as trustee, revoked 
the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust and commenced to sell the real 
property apartment. On or about November 2, 1988, the apartment 
complex of the Cavanaughs in Los Angeles was sold and the 
approximate cash sum of $675,000 was placed with the Bankruptcy 
Trustee. (Attached hereto as addendum C is a true and correct 
copy of a notice of sale of this property by the trustee coupled 
with a title report fully describing the property and liens 
thereon). 
On March 1, 1991 an Order was entered in the Bankruptcy 
Court lifting the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy 
Code for the sole purpose of allowing this appeal to be 
concluded so that a determination of Walker's interest in the 
cash proceeds of the sale of the real property could be 
determined. On April 15, 1991, Dennis McGoldrick, the Chapter 7 
Bankruptcy Trustee for the bankrupt estate of John and Violet 
Cavanaugh, was substituted as plaintiff and respondent in this 
action. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellants contend in POINT I of their argument that 
because Walker was a creditor of Cavanaughs and because 
Cavanaughs conveyances to trust were without consideration and 
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rendered them insolvent, the trust should be declared void to 
permit Walker to collect on his judgment, regardless of any 
actual intent to defraud. 
Appellants contend in POINT II of their argument that there 
are sufficient "badges or indicia" of an actual fraudulent 
conveyance and that for this reason the Cavanaugh Trust should 
also be declared void as against Walker's judgment. Those badges 
of fraud are (1) continuing in use and property ownership after 
the transfer; (2) conveyance at the commencement of this 
litigation; (3) a transfer to a family member, ie: the same 
Violet P. Cavanaugh as is the defendant; and (4) no 
consideration for the transfer. 
Appellants contend in POINT III of their argument that the 
legal basis upon which the lower Court did uphold the Cavanaugh 
Trust was an error. Appellants argue that the 1975 Utah Supreme 
Court case of Leach vs. Anderson should be expanded to include 
real property and that Section 25-1-11 of U.C.A. (1953), with 
it's reference to "Deeds" should include real property. Also on 
this point, the 1931 Geary v. Cain case, relied on by the lower 
Court, is easily distinguished because in Geary the transfer of 
property was an outright conveyance of title, without limitation 
or restriction, to a third party. 
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Appellants contend in POINT IV of their argument that the 
Cavanaughs knew they owed Walker $422,000 with interest on a 
promissory note and that the note was due. Cavanaughs conveyed 
real property to trust without consideration in anticipation of 
incurring a debt beyond their ability to pay. 
Appellants contend in POINT V of their argument that public 
policy and overwhelming legal authority prohibit a person from 
placing his property beyond the reach of creditors while at the 
same time allowing that person to retain an interest and control 
over the property. 
Appellants contend in POINT VI of their argument that there 
is no rational basis to distinguish real property from personal 
property for purposes of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST IS VOID AS AGAINST 
WALKER'S JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT TO REAL PROPERTY AND PROCEEDS 
THEREOF, AS WELL AS PERSONAL PROPERTY, PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED 25-1-4 (1953) AS AMENDED, AND THE CASE LAW THEREON. 
Section 25-1-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953 states: 
"Conveyances by insolvent. Every conveyance made, and every 
obligation incurred, by a person which is, or will be thereby 
rendered, insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors, without 
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regard to his actual intent, if the conveyance is made or the 
obligation is incurred without a fair consideration." 
In the Supreme Court case of Meyer v. General American 
Corp.. 569 P.2nd 1094, (Utah 1977), Mr. Justice Ellett in 
construing this statute stated the three essential elements that 
must be proved: 
"Both the statute and case law interpreting the statute 
make it clear that subjective or actual intent to defraud are 
not elements of a fraudulent conveyance claim. Meyer is 
obligated to show only (1) that she was a creditor of GAC; (2) 
that GAC was insolvent at the time the conveyance was made to 
Terra; and (3) that the conveyance was not given for a fair 
consideration." 
In the present case, all three of these elements are 
clearly evident. That Walker is a creditor of the Cavanaughs was 
proven before a jury and is shown by the judgment entered in the 
Third District Court in the sum of $779,537.74 in Walkers favor. 
(R-372). That Cavanaughs were rendered insolvent by the 
conveyance is clear from the fact that Cavanaughs transferred 
all their assets into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust, supported 
their lifestyle on the basis of the trust assets, and filed 
bankruptcy due to insolvency as a result of Walker's large 
judgment. (R-408 and Addendum A page 2). That the conveyance was 
not given for a fair consideration is clear from the findings of 
fact stated by Judge Rokich wherein he says, "No consideration 
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was given to Mrs. Cavanaugh for the transfer of the Trust assets 
into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust. (Addendum A page 2) 
Appellant Gordon D. Walker, contends that the argument set 
forth in this POINT I is sufficient in and of itself to reverse 
the ruling of the lower Court and enable Walker to now collect 
from the bankruptcy Trustee the proceeds of the sale of 
Cavanaughs real property. 
POINT II. THE FACTS ARE SUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT 
CAVANAUGHS HAD ACTUAL INTENT TO DEFRAUD THEIR CREDITOR AND THE 
VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST SHOULD BE DECLARED VOID AS AGAINST ALL 
ASSETS PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 25-1-7 (1953) AS AMENDED. 
Section 25-1-7 Utah Code-Annotated (1953) states: 
"Conveyance to hinder, delay, defraud creditors. Every 
conveyance made, and every obligation incurred, with actual 
intent, as distinguished from intent presumed in law, to hinder, 
delay or defraud either present or future creditors is 
fraudulent as to both present and future creditors." 
The Supreme Court case of Dahnken. Inc. Of Salt Lake vs. 
Wilmarth, 726 P.2nd 420 (Utah 1986), dealt with the transfer of 
real property by a son to his stepfather to avoid imminent 
creditors. When examining the issue of actual intent in the 
context of the above quoted statute, this court held the 
following: 
"Although actual fraudulent intent must be shown 
to hold a conveyance fraudulent pursuant to 25-1-7, its 
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existence may be inferred from the presence of certain indicia 
of fraud or "Badges of fraud." [Citing Given v. Lambeth, 10 Utah 
2nd 287, 291, 351 P. 2nd 959, 962 (I960).] Badges of fraud that 
pertain to this case are a debtor's (1) continuing in possession 
and evidencing the perquisites of property ownership after 
having formally conveyed all his interest in the property, (2) 
making a conveyance in anticipation of litigation, and (3) 
making a conveyance to a family member without receiving fair 
consideration." 
Dahnken, at 726 P.2nd at 423. 
All of these "Badges of Fraud" exist in the present case as 
well. With respect to subpart (1) from the above quote, 
property ownership prerequisites, Judge Rokich's findings of 
fact (page 2 of addendum A) make it very clear that the 
Cavanaughs continued in possession after the conveyance. 
Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of Judge Rokich's Memorandum Decision 
state as follows: 
"2. The Trust property of the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust 
has been treated no differently after the transfer into the 
Trust than it was before. 
3. Mrs. Cavanaugh retains full control over the Trust 
property, including the right to modify, amend or revoke the 
Trust at any time. 
4. Mrs. Cavanaugh has the full and complete enjoyment and 
benefit of the Trust property' for the duration of her life." 
Clearly Mr. and Mrs. Cavanaugh continued to enjoy all the 
benefits of the trust property after it was conveyed. 
With respect to subpart (2) of the above Dahnken quote, 
making a conveyance in anticipation of litigation, consider the 
uncontested and undeniable fact that on April 10, 1986 Walker 
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filed his action against Cavanaughs and on the same day, 
Cavanaughs transferred their California real property into the 
Trust. (R-452). Walker's claim, and ultimate verdict of 
$836,446.97, was easily forecasted by Cavanaughs because they 
had signed a $422,000 promissory note with Walker that was long 
overdue and payment thereon was being demanded. 
With regard to subpart (3), conveyance to a family member 
without receiving fair consideration, again look at Judge 
Rokich's finding of fact in his memorandum decision, which 
states, "No consideration was given to Mrs. Cavanaugh for the 
transfer of the Trust assets into the Violet P. Cavanaugh 
Trust." There was no consideration for this transfer and 
defendant debtor Violet P. Cavanaugh is the same Violet P. 
Cavanaugh in whose name the Trust was created. (Addendum A) 
As in Dahnken, we have here the obvious badges of fraud in 
that there was continued beneficial enjoyment of the property, 
anticipated litigation and no consideration. On the basis of 
Dahnken alone, this Court has the precedent to void the Trust as 
to the lawful and legitimate judgment lien of Mr. Walker. 
The Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, passed by the 
legislature in 1988, codifies these badges of fraud in U. C. A. 
25-6-5 (2). A copy of U. C. A. 25-6-5 (2) is attached hereto as 
addendum D. Appellant contends that the legislature, by adopting 
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this uniform act, has validated the law of Dahnken and 
reinforced the fairness of not allowing fraudulent conveyances 
to avoid creditors. 
There is another indication of fraudulent intent by the 
Cavanaughs in this case. On June 12, 1987, just several weeks 
after trial completion, Cavanaughs recorded eight Trust Deeds on 
the apartment property with insiders named as beneficiaries. 
These Trust Deeds total more than $220,000 in debt and 
effectively shield the property equity unless the Violet P. 
Cavanaugh Trust is declared void. (Addendum C page 7 and 8). 
These junior lien holders and insiders to the Cavanaughs, with 
Trust Deeds on the property recorded after Walker's judgment, 
will be given a priority to the cash proceeds of the sale of the 
apartment unless Judge Rokich's ruling is reversed. Appellant 
Walker respectfully asks this Court to apply the law of U.C.A. 
25-1-7 and Dahnken to stop Cavanaugh7s fraudulent conveyance 
scheme. 
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POINT III. THE BASIS UPON WHICH THE DISTRICT COURT DID 
UPHOLD THE CAVANAUGH TRUST AS AGAINST THE WALKER JUDGMENT IS 
ERRONEOUS AND LEACH vs. ANDERSON SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE 
REAL PROPERTY. 
The District Court held that the personal property 
transferred into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust was subject to 
execution. However, on the basis of GEARY vs. CAIN, 9 P.jid 396 
(Utah 1932), the District Court held that the real property 
transferred into this Trust could not be executed upon. Judge 
Rokich in his Memorandum Decision specifically stated; "If it 
were not for the Geary case the court would be inclined to 
invalidate the trust as to the real property also." (Addendum 
A, bottom of page 4) 
However, the Geary case is easily distinguished from the 
present case and can not be* considered as controlling law in 
this case. Mrs. Geary had a judgment against Mr. Cain and sought 
to execute against real property transferred into a corporation 
in which Mr. Cain had a share of stock. The name of the 
corporation was the Doris Trust Company. A simple reading of 
Geary clearly reveals that the transfers of real property were 
not into a trust in the name of the debtor, but consisted of an 
bona fide conveyance to a separate legal entity, ie: The Doris 
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Trust Company. The Supreme Court in Geary noted that the Doris 
Trust Company was legitimate, not the alter ego of the debtor, 
and that the transfers of real property had taken place at least 
four years before the creditor's claim arose against the debtor. 
After examining these conveyances, the Supreme Court stated in 
Geary as follows; "These are all outright conveyances of title, 
without limitations, reservations, or restrictions of any kind 
material to the present inquiry." (9 P..2d at 397). 
Thus in Geary, and unlike the present case, the transfer of 
the real property was a legitimate conveyance to a separate 
corporation and had nothing to do with a revocable trust set up 
solely for the benefit of the grantor debtors. The Supreme 
Court in Geary refused to allow Mrs. Geary to execute on the 
real property because the grantee thereof was neither the alter 
ego, agent, nor trustee of the grantor debtor. The facts and 
legal conclusions of the Geary case are dissimilar in all 
material respects to the present case. 
In the present case, in concluding that the Violet P. 
Cavanaugh Trust was valid as against Walker's judgment, the 
District Court apparently relied upon the following language of 
the Geary case; "Section 5816 [former U.C.A. 57-1-11, 
fraudulent transfer] relates only to transfers of personal 
property, not real property, " (9 P..2d at 399). This 
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statement by the court in Geary is obviously obiter dictum and 
had no real application to the Geary facts. The thrust of the 
Geary case was whether the Doris Trust Company was the alter ego 
of the judgment debtor. The Supreme Court concluded that it was 
not and protected the validity of the distinct corporate entity. 
It is the more recent case of Leach vs. Anderson. 535 
P.2d 1241 (Utah 1975), that examines U.C.A. 25-1-11 (1953) as 
amended, and the validity of conveyances made into a trust when 
the interests of creditors are concerned. Section 25-1-11 reads 
as follows: 
"Trust for Grantor void. All deeds, gifts, conveyances, 
transfers or assignments verbal or written, of goods, chattel, 
or things in action made in trust for the use of the person 
making the same shall be void as against the existing or 
subsequent creditors of such person." 
The Supreme Court in Leach ruled that the Trust created by 
Mrs. Anderson was invalid as against the judgment of Mr. Leach 
because it had been created for her use and benefit and could 
not be used to prevent the judgment creditor from recovering the 
obligation owing. However, in Leach, there were sufficient 
personal property assets to satisfy the judgment and therefore 
the Court did not address the issue as to whether the real 
property was also subject to plaintiff's judgment. The Supreme 
Court in Leach specifically opens the door against Geary by 
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recognizing the common law and questioning that section 25-1-11 
applies also to real property transfers: 
"Defendants also make the argument that the statute under 
scrutiny covers only personal property and therefore could not 
affect the part of the trust that consists of real property. The 
statute is but a codification of the common law, which for 
reasons discussed herein, refused to give recognition to trusts 
of this character involving any kind of property. However, the 
evidence here is that there is very substantial personal 
property, including stock in the Anderson Enterprises, valued at 
$145,000. Accordingly, no useful purpose would be served by our 
being concerned as to whether the real property may be subjected 
to plaintiff's judgment." (535 P. 2nd at 1244, emphasis added). 
Footnote 5 to the above Leach quote provides ample 
authority for the position that a trust for the benefit of the 
grantor is uniformly held entirely invalid as to any kind of 
property and creditors can reach the trust property. Appellant 
herein contends that the stated obiter dictum of Geary, relied 
upon by the lower Court in this case, is a clear aberration to 
the prevailing rule. The common law majority position should be 
followed in the present case for the obvious reason of 
protecting Walker's legitimate judgment against the fraudulent 
conveyance of Cavanaughs. 
Unlike the Leach case, the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust does 
not contain sufficient personal property to satisfy the judgment 
of Walker. Judge Rokich in his Memorandum Decision stated the 
following in this regard; 
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"It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court in the Leach case 
did not address the issue of real property being subject to 
execution if conveyed to a trust such as the Violet P. Cavanaugh 
Trust. Justice Ellett, author of the majority opinion, stated 
that inasmuch as there was ample personal property assets to 
satisfy the judgment it would not be necessary to address the 
real property issue." (Addendum A, at page 4) 
The real property issue in the Cavanaugh Trust must now be 
addressed because it is the only remaining source sufficient to 
pay the Walker judgment. Section 25-1-11 of U.C.A., with its 
reference to "deeds," and the case law of Leach, provides now a 
third legal basis upon which the decision of the lower court can 
and should be reversed to include real property. Accordingly, 
appellant respectfully requests that this Supreme Court follow 
the common law, expand Leach to include real property, and 
distinguish Geary as argued herein. 
For another important reason this Court can expand Leach to 
include real property pursuant to U.C.A. 25-1-11. With the 
passing of Utah Code Annotated 25-6 et. seq. , The Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act, former U.C.A. section 25-1-11 was 
repealed. Section 25-1-11 will be subject to review on a less 
frequent basis and quickly die altogether. In other words, the 
Geary case ruling on language identical to 25-1-11 is now moot 
because the language of 25-1-11 has been repealed. Future cases 
dealing with this issue will be construed pursuant to the new 
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statute. The changing of the law in this area has already been 
done by the legislative session of 1988. The Supreme Court is 
only being asked to focus on the legitimate claim of a single 
creditor. This Cavanaugh v. Walker case becomes a one time only 
precedent. 
POINT IV. UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 25-1-6 (1953) AS AMENDED 
PROVIDES ANOTHER STATUTORY BASIS TO VOID THE CAVANAUGH TRUST 
WITH RESPECT TO THE REAL PROPERTY CASH PROCEEDS CONTAINED 
THEREIN. 
Section 25-1-6 U.C.A. 1953 provides the following; 
"Conveyances by persons about to incur debts. Every conveyance 
made and every obligation incurred, without fair consideration, 
when the person making the conveyance or entering into the 
obligation intends to, or believes that he will, incur debts 
beyond his ability to pay as they mature, is fraudulent as to 
both present and future creditors." 
In this case, Cavanaughs knew that a promissory note for 
$422,000 was due and owing with interest. The debt was incurred 
and about to be reduced to judgment. There was no consideration, 
as has been previously discussed, and this obligation by 
Cavanaugh to Walker was beyond Cavanaughs ability to pay absent 
the trust assets. Thus this section of the code provides yet 
another basis to hold for Walker and invalidate the Cavanaugh 
Trust. 
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All four sections of the Utah Code set forth so far in this 
brief can and should be construed to apply to the facts of this 
case. On the basis of one or all of these sections, the lower 
Court should be reversed. 
POINT V. PUBLIC POLICY PROHIBITS AN OWNER OF REAL OR 
PERSONAL PROPERTY FROM PLACING THAT PROPERTY BEYOND THE REACH 
OF HIS CREDITORS WHILE HE CONTINUES TO BENEFIT AND ENJOY IT. 
Appellant contends that the judgment debtors should not be 
allowed to hide their assets behind a revocable grantor trust, 
set up for their benefit and use, to the detriment of their 
legitimate judgment creditors. There are no valid public policy 
arguments that would allow a party in litigation to transfer his 
real property into a trust, for his benefit and use, and thereby 
prevent an execution thereon by a creditor. Public policy 
demands that such transfers into trust be held void as to lawful 
creditors. In LEACH, the Utah Supreme Court stated with regard 
to section 25-1-11 U.C.A. 1953: 
"The intent and the effect of the statute is to prevent a 
person from using a trust as a device by which he can retain for 
himself and enjoy substantially all of the advantages of 
ownership and at the same time place it beyond the legitimate 
claims of his creditors." (535 P..2d at 1243) 
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Indeed, nothing would be more abhorrent and frustrating to 
the judicial system than preventing recovery of judgments by 
simply allowing debtors to transfer their real estate into a 
trust pending litigation. The law is clear and public policy is 
firmly opposed to the possibility of the beneficial owner of 
property placing that property beyond the reach of his creditors 
while continuing to enjoy it. 
The general rule is stated at 37 Am Jur 2d, page 720; 
"The recognized indicia or badges of fraud concerning 
conveyances attacked as fraudulent as to creditors include any 
reservation of benefit to the transferor or his family. One may 
not be the beneficial owner of property and still have it exempt 
from his debts. Indeed, it has been said that no effort of a 
debtor to hinder or delay his creditors is more severely 
condemned by law than an attempt to place his property where he 
can enioy it and at the same time require his creditors to await 
his pleasure for the payment of their claims out of it. 
Subsequent, as well as existing, creditors may have such a 
transaction declared fraudulent." (Section 27, emphasis added). 
"Basically, it is recognized that an individual cannot 
create out of his own property for his own benefit a trust for 
himself and thereby defeat his creditors of their lawful 
demands." 
(Section 28, emphasis added). 
Numerous cases and other legal authorities have phrased 
this basic law in articulate terms. In Nelson v. California 
Trust Co. . 33 Cal.2d 501, 202 P.2d 1021 (1949), the judgment 
creditor sought to reach the assets of a trust created by his 
judgment debtor. The California court held that all of the 
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trust property was subject to the claim of the creditor, and 
said; 
"It is against public policy to permit a man to tie up his 
property in such a way that he can enjoy it but prevent his 
creditors from reaching it, and where the settlor mcikes himself 
a beneficiary of a trust any restraints in the instrument on the 
involuntary alienation of . his interest are invalid and 
ineffective. [citations omitted]. Since Bixby was the sole 
beneficiary, all the property in the trust is subject to the 
claims of his creditors." ((202 P.2nd at 1021, emphasis added). 
Cited with approval in the Nelson case is McColcran v.Walter 
Maaee. Inc.. 172 Cal. 182, 155 P. 995 (1916), where the 
California court held that a spendthrift trust attempted to be 
created in the settlor's own favor is invalid, even though he 
had no fraudulent intent toward his creditors. The cases are 
uniform in holding that quite apart from statute, a person 
cannot create a spendthrift trust for himself which shall be 
effective against the rights of his subsequent creditors. (See 
44 Harvard Law Review 205 Erwin Griswold). Furthermore, as 
shown in the above quote, there is no distinction between real 
and personal property for purposes of this case. In the 
commercial marketplace real property equity is used as a cash 
medium every bit as much as personal property. 
The Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust in this case contains the 
following spendthrift clause; 
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ARTICLE X 
SPENDTHRIFT PROVISION 
"The interests of each beneficiary in income and principal 
shall be free from the control or interference of any creditor 
of such beneficiary, or the spouse of a married beneficiary, or 
the parent of the child beneficiary, and shall not be subject to 
attachment or be subject to assignment." (R-410). 
In light of this spendthrift clause and Judge Rokich's 
findings of fact that Violet Cavanaugh is the beneficiary and 
sole trustee of the Trust with full control over it, (R-389), 
consider these additional authorities cited with approval by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Leach: 
"Even in jurisdictions in which spendthrift trusts are 
permitted, the settler cannot create a spendthrift trust for his 
own benefit. It is immaterial that in creating the trust the 
settler did not intend to defraud his creditors. It is 
immaterial that he was solvent at the time of creation of the 
trust." Scott on trusts, Vol.11, Sec.156, p.1092. 
"If a settlor creates a trust for his own benefit and 
inserts a spendthrift clause, it is void as far as then existing 
or future creditors are concerned, and they can reach his 
interest under the trust." Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, (2d 
Ed.), Sec.223, at p.438. 
"A man cannot put his own property beyond the reach of 
creditors and at the same time reserve substantial interests in 
it or control over it." Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts, page 543. 
The following two quotes, dated 1862 and 1898 respectively, 
well characterize the negative impact of allowing a debtor to 
conceal his assets from just creditors by use of a trust. 
"It would revolutionize the credit system entirely, destroy 
all faith in the apparent ownership of property, and repeal all 
our statutes and decisions against frauds. Every man about to 
- 28 -
engage in business where there was a chance of loss, would place 
himself under the pupilage of trustees, and everybody's estates 
would be passing under settlement deeds and trustees' accounts 
through the courts, before, in the natural course of things, the 
jurisdiction of the Orphans7 Court would attach." Mackason's 
Appeal. 42 Pa. 330 at 338, (1862) 
"It would be a startling and revolutionary doctrine to hold 
that this reserved interest cannot be reached by the plaintiff 
as a creditor. If such is the law it would make it possible for 
a person free from debt to place his property beyond the reach 
of creditors, and secure to himself a comfortable support during 
life, without regard to his subsequent business ventures, 
contracts or losses." Schenck v. Barnes. 50 N.E. 967, N.Y. 316, 
321, 41 L.R.A. 395, ^^ 
The above general statements of the law and public policy 
are followed in many cases set out in the notes to 119 ALR 35 
and 34 ALR 2d 1342. The cases cited uniformly hold that the 
grantor cannot avoid or hinder his own creditors by such a 
provision as is in the Cavanaugh Trust. The very creation of the 
Cavanaugh Trust with it's spendthrift provision, made at the 
commencing of this litigation, evidences a scheme with a clear 
purpose of placing property beyond the reach of creditors. 
Appellant Walker was the imminent creditor, his $422,000 
promissory note was long past due. In the Cavanaugh Trust the 
spendthrift provision is expressly for the protection and 
insulation of the grantors who thereafter became indebted to 
Walker. By the terms of the trust, all of the assets can be used 
and have been used for the benefit of the grantors and the 
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entire trust should now be declared void as against this 
creditor of the grantors. 
Another on point statement of the controlling rule 
applicable to this case is set forth in the Restatement of 
Trusts Second, Section 156, p. 326, as follows; 
"156 WHERE THE SETTLOR IS A BENEFICIARY 
(1) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust with a 
provision restraining the voluntary or involuntary transfer of 
his interest, his transferee or creditors can reach his 
interests. 
(2) Where a person creates for his own benefit a trust for 
support or a discretionary trust, his transferee or creditors 
can reach the maximum amount which the trustee under the terms 
of the trust could pay to him or apply for his benefit." 
The Comment following this restatement of the law is also 
relevant; 
" a. Intention to defraud creditors not required. The rules 
stated in this Section are applicable although the transfer is 
not a fraudulent conveyance. The interest of the settlor-
beneficiary can be reached by subsequent creditors as well as by 
those who were creditors at the time of the creation of the 
trust, and it is immaterial that the settlor-beneficiary had no 
intention to defraud his creditors." 
The numerous quotes in this POINT V tie back as well to the 
arguments set forth in POINTS I, II, III and IV. These 
statements of law are grouped here to emphasize the strong 
public policy which prohibits transfers to trusts to avoid 
creditors. In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Rokich made the 
following conclusions; "There is no question that the Violet P. 
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Cavanaugh Trust was created for her own use and benefit and to 
the detriment of her creditors, (R-390). If it were not for the 
Geary case the court would be inclined to invalidate the trust 
as to the real property also." (R-391). In other words, the 
District court recognized the injustice of these transfers into 
trust, but felt legally bound by Geary to uphold the trust as to 
the real property. Appellant again respectfully requests that 
this Court follow the sound reasoning of the uniformly held 
position by declaring the Viplet P. Cavanaugh trust void as to 
real property as well as personal property. 
POINT VI. THERE IS NO RATIONAL BASIS TO DISTINGUISH REAL FROM 
PERSONAL PROPERTY IN THIS CASE AND THE VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST 
SHOULD BE DECLARED VOID AS TO BOTH TYPES OF PROPERTY. 
On April 25, 1988, six weeks after Judge Rokich's ruling in 
this case, Utah adopted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, now 
codified in U.C.A. Section 25 Chapter 6. Appellant argues that 
the enactment of this uniform statute provides a strong reason 
for The Supreme Court to reverse the lower Court and hold in 
this case that the real property of Cavanaughs can not be 
conveyed to trust free of the judgment of Walker- The Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act makes no distinction between real and 
- 31 -
personal property, or property in trust as opposed to an 
outright conveyance. This Fraudulent Transfer Act simply defines 
property as anything that may be the subject of ownership. 
Appellants urge The Supreme Court to also eliminate this 
artificial distinction between real and personal property 
conveyances to avoid creditors. 
That the distinction between real and personal property is 
artificial is evident by the fact that Cavanaugh's Bankruptcy 
Trustee, Mr. Dennis McGoldrick, sold the Cavanaugh real property 
on November 2, 1988 and took possession of the cash proceeds. 
Those proceeds are being held pending the outcome of this 
appeal. The real property was thus easily and quickly reduced to 
cash by a sale. There simply is no basis to justify voiding the 
Cavanaugh Trust as to personal property, but not real property. 
The United States Bankruptcy, law enabled the Trustee to revoke 
the Cavanaugh Trust entirely, without regard to the different 
types of property contained therein. Appellant fails to 
understand any logical basis upon which the bankruptcy trustee 
can immediately reach all assets of the trust, while the prior 
judgment creditor, appellant herein, can only reach the personal 
property assets which are insufficient to satisfy his judgment. 
None of the authorities cited in POINT V make a distinction 
between real and personal property. Real property in todays 
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economy is for all practical purposes every bit as liquid as 
personal property. To disallow Walker from recovering his 
judgment on the basis of this mock distinction is totally 
unjustified. 
CONCLUSION 
This case presently consists of an obvious injustice upon 
the appellant. For the sole reason that Mr. and Mrs. Cavanaugh 
had their equity in real estate, as opposed to personalty, Mr. 
Walker is unable to satisfy his judgment. That judgment came 
after a jury trial and the substance of the trial is not being 
contested. Each and every one of the four Fraudulent Conveyance 
Statutes provides a basis to invalidate the Violet P. Cavanaugh 
Trust and allow Mr. Walker to satisfy his judgment from the real 
property assets contained therein. Strong public policy condemns 
this kind of conveyance transaction. The real property has been 
reduced to cash and is being held by the bankruptcy Trustee, 
pending a decision by this court. In substance therefore, there 
is no difference between real* and personal property. 
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Appellant respectfully seeks an Order from this Court 
reversing the Final Order of the lower Court, (Addendum C) and 
declaring the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust void as to both the 
personal property and the real property cash proceeds. The 
judgment lien of Walker would then have attached to the real 
property of Cavanaugh upon entry of judgment and justly enable 
him to now satisfy his judgment. 
Dated this O*^ ^> day of June 
Lchard K. Nebeker 
Attorney for Appellant 
Gordon D. Walker 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that T ct true and correct copy5 of the 
appellant's brief was hand delivered to the office of 
Respondent's counsel, Douglas J. Payne, at 215 South State 
Street, suite 1200, this 1 ^  day of July 1991. 
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ADDENDUM * 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN A, CAVANAUGH and : 
VIOLET CAVANAUGH, 
Plaintiffs, 
: MEMORANDUM DECISION 
VS. 
: CIVIL NO. C 85-1499 
GORDON D. WALKER and COVECREST 
PROPERTIES, a Utah Limited 
Partnership, 
Defendants and : 
Counter-Claimants for 
Foreclosure. : 
Defendants1 Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings 
came on for hearing on the 13th day of November. Plaintiffs were 
represented by Colin R. Winchester. Defendants were represented 
by Richard R. Nebeker. The court heard testimony, received a 
copy of the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust and granted counsel an 
opportunity to submit memoranda. The court took the matter under 
advisement pending the receipt of the memoranda. The court 
orally advised counsel of its decision and stated that a written 
memorandum decision would be mailed to counsel. 
The issue presented to the court is whether the property 
transferred by John Arthur Cavanaugh and Violet P. Cavanaugh into 
the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust pending this litigation is now 
subject to lawful execution by the judgment creditor. 
CAVANAUGH V WALKER, ET AL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
In order to arrive at a decision in this case it was 
essential to ascertain what the facts are in order to determine 
the validity of the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust. 
The court found the facts to be as follows: 
1. No consideration was given to Mrs. Cavanaugh for the 
transfer of the Trust assets into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust. 
2. The Trust property of the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust has 
been treated no differently after the transfer into the Trust 
than it was before. 
3. Mrs. Cavanaugh retains full control over the trust 
property, including the right to modify, amend or revoke the 
Trust at any time. 
4. Mrs. Cavanaugh has the full and complete enjoyment and 
benefit of the Trust property for the duration of her life. 
5. Mrs. Cavanaugh may transfer the Trust property at any 
time for any purpose. 
6. Mrs. Cavanaugh is the beneficiary of all Trust property 
and proceeds. 
7. The alleged sole purpose for the Trust was to provide 
for tax benefits. 
8. At present, Violet P. Cavanaugh is the sole Trustee and 
will remain so for the duration of her life. 
9. A true and correct copy of the Trust is attached 
hereto, and the Trust itself substantiates the above 
representation. 
CAVANAUGH V. WALKER, ET AL PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ARGUMENT 
Section 25-1-11 U.C.A. (1953) as amended is directly in 
point and provides as follows: 
25-1-11 Trust for Grantor void. All deeds, gifts, 
conveyances, transfers or assignments verbal or written, of 
goods, chattel, or things in action made in trust for the use of 
the person making the same shall be void as against the existing 
or subsequent creditors of such person. 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Leach v. Anderson, 525 
P2d 1241 (1975) interpreted Section 25-1-11 and the applicability 
to a case with similar facts in this case. 
The Supreme Court in the Leach v. Anderson case ruled that 
the trust created in the Leach case was invalidated. 
In comparing the facts in this case to the facts in the 
Leach case the court concludes that the law set forth in the 
Leach case is applicable. 
There is no question that the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust was 
created for her own use and benefit and to the detriment of her 
creditors. 
The court concludes that the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust is 
declared invalid as to the personal property conveyed to the 
trust. The invalidation of the trust as to the personal property 
is not to be interpreted to mean that the defendants are 
precluded from executing on other assets of the plaintiffs. 
CAVANAUGH V WALKER, ET AL PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
It is unfortunate that the Supreme Court in the Leach case 
did not address the issue of real property being subject to 
execution if conveyed to a trust such as the Violet P. Cavanaugh 
Trust, Justice Ellett, author of the majority opinion, stated 
that inasmuch as there was ample personal property assets to 
satisfy the judgment it would not be necessary to address the 
real property issue. 
Since the Leach case did not address the issue of whether 
real property would be subject to defendants1 judgment; the court 
referred to Geary v. Cain 9 P2d 396 1932 cited by plaintiffs. 
The Geary case interpreted Section 5816 which is identical to 
Section 25-1-11 and stated as follows: Section 5816 relates only 
to transfers of personal property, not real property, and hence 
has no application to the conveyance of the real estate here 
involved. It relates only to "goods, chattels or things in 
action", which in any sense of the terms are not real property. 
The statute has remained unchanged and the Geary decision 
has not been overruled. 
If it were not for the Geary case the court would be 
inclined to invalidate the trust as to the real property also. 
Dated February 16, 1988. 
JUDGE JOHN A, ROKICH 
Copies mailed to counsel. 
^nnrMQUM H 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
Richard K. Nebeker (A2370) 
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Attorney for Gordon D. Walker 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
JOHN A. CAVANAUGH and 
VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs . 
GORDON D. WALKER and COVECREST 
PROPERTIES, a Utah Limited 
Partnership, 
Defendants and 
Counter-Claimants for 
Foreclosure. 
* * * * * * * 
Defendant and counter-claimant, Gordon D. Walker's Motion 
and Order in Supplemental Proceedings came on for Hearing on 
the 13th day of November, 1987. Plaintiffs were represented by 
Colin R. Winchester. Defendants were represented by Richard K. 
Nebeker. The Court heard testimony, received a copy of the 
Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust and granted counsel an opportunity to 
submit memoranda. The Court took the matter under advisement 
ORDER PARTIALLY INVALIDATING 
THE VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST 
Civil No. C85-1499 
pending the receipt of the memoranda. 
The issue presented to the Court was whether the property 
transferred by John Arthur Cavanaugh and Violet P. Cavanaugh 
into the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust pending this litigation is 
now subject to lawful execution by the judgment creditor. 
Legal memoranda was submitted by the parties, and based 
upon the testimony given, the records and files of the Court, 
I and said legal memoranda, the Court issued its Memorandum 
| Decision, (a copy of which is attached hereto). Now therefore, 
j and in accordance with said Memorandum Decision, it is hereby; 
i 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT; 
j The Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust is invalid as to all of the 
I personal property, conveyed to the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust 
including but not limited to all accounts receivable, notes 
payable, rents collectible, securities, goods, chattels, 
accounts, personalty and things in action held within said 
Trust. Accordingly, any and all such personal property may now 
be legally and lawfully executed upon by 
defendants/counter-claimiants Gordon D. Walker and Covecrest 
Properties. 
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On the basis of Geary v Cain 9 P2d 396 (1932) the Violet P. 
Cavanaugh Trust is hereby declared valid with respect to the 
real property held in the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust and 
defendants/counter-claimants are precluded from foreclosing 
said real property. 
Neither this Order nor the Courts Memorandum Decision shall 
preclude defendants/counter-claimants from executing on the 
personal property assets of the plaintiffs including real 
estate held outside of the Violet P. Cavanaugh Trust. 
Approved: 
iichard K. Nebeker 
Attorney for Defendant Counter-Claimant 
Corift "R. Winchester 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Dated t h i s Z£ day of March, 1988 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) M 
«. THE UNDERSIGNED. CLERK OF THE DISTHlCi 
CCU*T OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH. OGHEREBr 
CCTTvTV THAI THE ANNEXED ANO FOftEGtMNQ !S 
A r.iu£ ANO FULL COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DfcCU-
1/ * VT ON RLE IN MY OFFICEtA£ SUCH CLERK. \ 
BY T " U I 
CDN3498N 
B y _ 
V -f]J^cL )s " & 
Dated 
Mard \5, tttf( 
Dated 
/? 
John A. Rokich 
TUFRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
DEPUTY 
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Dennis E. McGoldrick #97720 
McGoldrick & McGoldrick 
18726 Western Avenue, Suite 208 
Gardena, California 90248-3829 
(213) 327-7212 
Attorneys for Trustee 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
In re: 
JOHN ARTHUR CAVANAUGH 
VIOLET PHYLLIS CAVANAUGH 
Debtors. 
Bky. No. LA88-12763-CA 
Chapter 7 
STIPULATION TO ALLOW 
TRUSTEE TO SELL REAL 
PROPERTY FREE AND CLEAR OF 
LIENS AND INTERESTS [11 U.S.C. 
§ 363(f)]; ORDER THEREON 
Date: (NO HEARING NECESSARY) 
Time: 
Courtroom: "8529", 8th Floor 
Dennis E. McGoldrick, trustee, Gordon D. Walker and Covecrest 
Properties, a Utah Limited Partnership, enter into the following 
stipulation based upon the following facts: 
1. Dennis E. McGoldrick is the duly appointed and acting 
trustee of the estate in this Chapter 7 proceeding. 
2. The Bankruptcy Estate includes property commonly 
[described as 130 and 136 East Avenue 42, Los Angeles, California 
|and more particularly described as: 
LOTS 7 AND 8 IN BLOCK 5 OF G. W. MORGAN'S SYCAMORE 
GROVE TRACT, IN THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES, IN THE COUNTY 
OF LOS ANGELES, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AS PER MAP RECORDED 
IN BOOK 11 PAGES 57 AND 58 OF MISCELLANEOUS RECORD, IN 
b:\t\stip 1.12.89 narro i 
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THE OFFICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER OF SAID COUNTY, 
(hereafter "the property") 
3. The trustee desires to sell the property free and clear 
of all interests. 
4. The trustee filed an application to sell said property 
free and clear of all interests, but counsel for the trustee 
neglected to give notice of said application to Gordon D. Walker 
and Covecrest Properties (hereafter "Walker and Covecrest"). Said 
application was approved and an order was entered allowing the 
sale of the property free and clear of all liens on November 2, 
1988. The trustee now desires to clear the problem created by 
lack of notice ot Walker and Covecrest. 
5. Walker and Covecrest, creditors of this estate, wish to 
see the assets of this estate liquidated so that creditors of this 
estate may be paid. 
6. Walker and Covecrest have different types of claims of 
lien on the property, including a notice of pendency of action 
recorded as instrument 87-825004 on May 26, 1987, a notice of 
pendency of action recorded as instrument 87-1448447 on September 
9, 1987, and an abstract of judgment recorded as 88-80842 on 
January 20, 1988. The title report attached as Exhibit "A", and 
incorporated herein by this reference, lists these items a items 
7, 16 and 17. 
7. When the abstract of judgment was filed, title to the 
property was not in the Cavanaugh's name. Titl*=> to the property 
jwas in the Violet Cavanaugh Trust until the trust was revoked oy 
Dennis E. McGoldrick in his capacity as bankruptcy trustee. 
I/// 
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NOW THEREFORE, the parties stipulate: 
1. The trustee, Dennis E. McGoldrick, may sell the property 
free and clear of all of the Walker and Covecrest liens (including 
items 7, 16 and 17 on said title report). 
2. The liens, to the extent they now encumber the property, 
shall encumber the proceeds of the sale of said property. 
SO STIPULATED: 
Dated: January 12, 1989 
~s-
Dated: January ./ 1989 
Dennis E. McGoldrick, Trustee 
Gordon D. Walker 
Covecrest Properties, a Utah 
Limited Partnership 
Dated: January 1989 By: % -
General Partner 
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker 
Attorneys for Walker and Covecrest 
By: 
-S -
Richard K. Nebeker 
ORDER 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: January , 1989 BY THE COURT 
- .s -
CALVIN K. ASHLAND 
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge 
c:\t\stip 1.12.89 page 3 
TICOR TITLE 1,DURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORi.xA 
240 ARTESIA BLVD., TORRANCE, CALIFORNIA 90504 TEL. (213) 542-0511 
OCTOBER 25, 1988 
BAY SHORE ESCROW 
1026 MANHATTAN BEACH BLVD. 
MANHATTAN BEACH, CALIFORNIA 90266 
ENTION: TREVA 
IR REFERENCE: 14281 
: NO. : 8544257 
IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE REFERENCED APPLICATION FOR A POLICY OF 
FLE INSURANCE, TICOR TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA HEREBY 
>ORTS THAT IT IS PREPARED TO ISSUE, OR CAUSE TO BE ISSUED, AS OF THE 
TE HEREOF, A POLICY OR POLICIES OF TITLE INSURANCE DESCRIBING THE LAND 
) THE ESTATE OR INTEREST THEREIN HEREINAFTER SET FORTH, INSURING 
UNST LOSS WHICH MAY BE SUSTAINED BY REASON OF ANY DEFECT, LIEN OR 
:UMBRANCE NOT SHOWN OR REFERRED TO AS AN EXCEPTION BELOW OR NOT 
:i_UDED FROM COVERAGE PURSUANT TO THE PRINTED SCHEDULES, CONDITIONS AND 
IPULATIONS OF SAID POLICY FORMS. 
THE PRINTED EXCEPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS FROM THE COVERAGE OF SAID 
LICY OR POLICIES ARE SET FORTH ON THE ATTACHED COVER. COPIES OF THE 
LICY FORMS SHOULD BE READ. THEY ARE AVAILABLE FROM THE OFFICE WHICH 
SUED THIS REPORT. 
THIS REPORT (AND ANY SUPPLEMENTS OR AMENDMENTS THERETO) IS ISSUED 
LELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF FACILITATING THE ISSUANCE OF A POLICY OF TITLE 
SURANCE AND NO LIABILITY IS ASSUMED HEREBY. IF IT IS DESIRED THAT 
ABILITY BE ASSUMED PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF A POLICY OF TITLE 
(SURANCE, A BINDER OR COMMITMENT SHOULD BE REQUESTED. 
iTED AT 7:30 A.M. AS OF OCTOBER 17, 1988 
[TLE OFFICER: D.MC CRADY 
IE FORM OF POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE CONTEMPLATED BY THIS REPORT IS: 
_TA LOAN POLICY - 1970 WITH ALTA ENDORSEMENT FORM 1 COVERAGE 
WENDED 10-17-70) 
TITLE TO THE ESTATE OR INTEREST REFERRED TO HEREIN, AT THE DATE 
EREOF, IS VESTED IN: 
JOHN A. CAVANAUGH AND VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH,HUSBAND AND WIFE, AS JOINT 
ENANTS 
n^oiHouM n rn-,r 4 
TICOR TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 
THE ESTATE OR INTEREST IN THE LAND HEREINAFTER DESCRIBED OR REFERRED TO 
COVERED BY THIS REPORT IS: A FEE. 
VT THE DATE HEREOF EXCEPTIONS TO COVERAGE IN ADDITION TO THE PRINTED 
IXCEPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS CONTAINED IN SAID POLICY FORM WOULD BE AS 
rOLLOWS: 
GENERAL AND SPECIAL COUNTY AND CITY TAXES 
OR THE FISCAL YEAR 
OTAL AMOUNT 
IRST INSTALLMENT 
ECOND INSTALLMENT 
ODE AREA 
ARCEL NO. 
SSESSED VALUATIONS 
AND 
MPROVEMENTS 
XEMPTIONS 
ET 
1988-1989, INCLUDING PERSONAL PROPERTY 
$1,806.24 
$905.79 
: $900.45 
4 
5467-2-7 
FOR THE YEAR 1988-1989 
• $21,296.00 
$136,675.00 
: NONE 
$158,491.00 
TAX, IF ANY, 
THE LIEN OF SUPPLEMENTAL TAXES, IF ANY, ASSESSED PURSUANT TO THE 
ROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 3.5 (COMMENCING WITH SECTION 75) OF THE REVENUE 
W TAXATION CODE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. 
AN EASEMENT AFFECTING THE PORTION OF SAID LAND AND FOR THE 
JRPOSES STATED HEREIN, AND INCIDENTAL PURPOSES, 
i FAVOR OF : CITY OF LOS ANGELES 
10 REPRESENTATION IS MADE AS TO THE PRESENT OWNERSHIP OF SAID EASEMENT) 
)R 
XORDED 
FECTS 
CONDUCTING WATER 
IN BOOK 61 PAGE 208 OF DEEDS 
LOT 7 
A DEED OF TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT 
ATED HEREIN 
TED 
OUNT 
USTOR 
USTEE 
NEFICIARY 
:ORDED 
?TRUMENT NO, 
MARCH 7, 1977 
$136,500.00 
BRUCE A. BRAUN, BRIAN GURNEE, ROBERT ACHESON AND JOHN 
FITZPATRICK, EACH MARRIED MEN, AS THEIR SOLE AND SEPARATE 
PROPERTY, AS TO AN UNDIVIDED 25 PER CENT INTEREST 
SUPERIOR TITLE SERVICE, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 
UNION FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, A CORPORATION 
MARCH 28, 1977 
77-306194 
AODBNDUM C PME 5 
TICOR TITLE J...SURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 
AN ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS, AS ADDITIONAL SECURITY FOR THE PAYMENT OF 
INDEBTEDNESS SECURED BY THE DEED OF TRUST INSURED HEREIN, WHICH 
[GNMENT WAS 
:UTED BY 
ORDED 
INCLUDES 
BRUCE A. BRAUN, BRIAN GURNEE, ROBERT ACHESON AND JOHN 
FITZPATRICK EACH MARRIED MEN, AS THEIR SOLE AND SEPARATE 
PROPERTY, AS TO AN UNDIVIDED 25 PER CENT 
UNION FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION 
MARCH 28, 1977 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 77-306195 
RENTAL 
A DEED OF TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT 
TED HEREIN 
ED 
UNT 
STOR 
ISTEE 
IEFICIARY 
)ORDED 
TRUMENT NO. 
MAY 6, 1982 
$241,000.00 
JOHN CAVANAUGH AND VIOLET CAVANAUGH, HUSBAND AND WIFE 
SAFECO TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION 
TACOMA SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, AN ASSOCIATION 
JUNE 29, 1982 
82-650956 
INSTRUMENT 
i TRUSTEE 
TED 
:ORDED 
SUBSTITUTES THE TRUSTEE IN SAID DEED OF TRUST 
T. D. SERVICE COMPANY 
SEPTEMBER 28, 1984 
OCTOBER 2, 1984 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 84-1187525 
1'ICE OF DEFAULT UNDER THE TERMS OF SAID DEED OF TRUST BY THE 
LEGED OWNER AND HOLDER OF THE NOTE SECURED THEREBY 
CORDED : OCTOBER 2, 1984 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 84-1187526 
ECUTED BY : AMERICAN SAVINGS BANK 
AN ACTION IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT 
DICIAL DISTRICT: LOS ANGELES 
MMENCED 
TITLED 
iSE NO. 
iTURE OF ACTION 
TECTS 
MAY 21, 1987 
GORDON D. WALKER AND COVECREST PROPERTIES VS. JOHN A. 
CAVANAUGH, VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH AND SNOWCAP PROPERTIES 
87K21089, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
TO SET ASIDE THE TRANSFER OF THE REAL PROPERTY INTO THE 
VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST ON THE BASIS THAT SAID TRANSFER 
WAS DONE TO AVOID POTENTIAL CREDITORS. 
SAID LAND 
)TICE OF THE PENDENCY OF SAID ACTION WAS 
£CORDED: MAY 26, 1987 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 87-825004 
ADDENDUM C P»\nE 6 
TICOR TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 
A DEED OF TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT 
FATED HEREIN 
OCTOBER 5, 1981 
$80,000.00 
VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST, VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUSTEE 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
EDNA ZIMMER 
JUNE 12, 1987 
87-934483 
*TED 
10UNT 
iUSTOR 
<USTEE 
:NEFICIARY 
[CORDED 
ISTRUMENT NO 
A DEED OF TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT 
ATED HEREIN 
TED : APRIL 25, 1983 
OUNT : $30,000.00 
USTOR : VIOLET P. CANANAUGH TRUST, VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUSTEE DATED 
MARCH 20, 1986 
USTEE : FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
NEFICIARY : EDNA ZIMMER 
CORDED : JUNE 12, 1987 
STRUMENT NO.: 87-934484 
A DEED OF TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT 
*TED HEREIN 
TED : JUNE 30, 1983 
)UNT : $15,000.00 
JSTOR : VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST, VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH, TRUSTEE DATED 
MARCH 20, 1986 
ISTEE : FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
IEFICIARY : EDWARD ZIMMER 
IORDED : JUNE 12, 1987 
TRUMENT NO.: 87-934485 
A DEED OF TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT 
TED HEREIN 
ED : NOVEMBER 14, 1984 
UNT : $36,995.00 
STOR : VIOLET P. CANANAUGH TRUST, VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUSTEE DATED 
MARCH 20, 1986 
STEE : FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
EFICIARY : EDNA ZIMMER 
DRDED : JUNE 12, 1987 
TRUMENT NO.: 87-934486 
ADDENDUM C PAHE 7 
TICOR TITLE ... DURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFOK.MIA 
A DEED OF TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT 
iTED HEREIN 
APRIL 23, 1985 
$14,095.00 
VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST, VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH, TRUSTEE DATED 
MARCH 20, 1986 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
EDWARD ZIMMER 
JUNE 12, 1987 
87-934487 
ED 
IUNT 
ISTOR 
ISTEE 
JEFICIARY 
:ORDED 
;TRUMENT NO. 
A DEED OF TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT 
*TED HEREIN 
TED 
3UNT 
JSTOR 
JSTEE 
NEFICIARY 
CORDED 
STRUMENT NO. 
MAY 6, 1983 
$20,000.00 
VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST, VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH, TRUSTEE DATED 
MARCH 20, 1986 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
EDWARD ZIMMER 
JUNE 12, 1987 
87-934488 
A DEED OF TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT 
ATED HEREIN 
TED 
lOUNT 
USTOR 
,'USTEE 
:NEFICIARY 
.CORDED 
ISTRUMENT NO. 
FEBRUARY 28, 1986 
$10,800.00 
VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST, VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH, TRUSTEE DATED 
MARCH 20, 1986 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
EDWARD ZIMMER 
JUNE 12, 1987 
87-934489 
>. A DEED OF TRUST TO SECURE AN INDEBTEDNESS IN THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT 
TATED HEREIN 
*TED : MAY 15, 1984 
10UNT : $15,000.00 
*USTOR : VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH TRUST, VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH, TRUSTEE DATED 
MARCH 20, 1986 
*USTEE : FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
ENEFICIARY : EDWARD ZIMMER 
ECORDED : JUNE 12, 1987 
MSTRUMENT NO.: 87-934490 
ADDENDUM C PK1E 3 
TICOR TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA '-
6. AN ACTION IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT 
IUDICIAL DISTRICT: LOS ANGELES 
UMMENCED 
NTITLED 
ASE NO. 
ATURE OF ACTION 
FFECTS 
AUGUST 6, 1987 
COVECREST PROPERTIES AND GORDON D. WALKER VS. JOHN A. 
CAVANAUGH AND VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH 
0660705, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
NOW CONSTITUTES A GOOD AND SUFFICIENT JUDGMENT LIEN ON THE 
REAL PROPERTY 
SAID LAND 
OTICE OF THE PENDENCY OF SAID ACTION WAS 
ECORDED: SEPTEMBER 9, 1987 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 87-1448447 
7. AN ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT FOR THE AMOUNT HEREIN STATED AND ANY 
THER AMOUNTS DUE 
*SE NO. 
ZBTOR 
"<EDITOR 
10UNT 
4TERED 
•CORDED 
C 660 705, LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT 
JOHN A. CANAVAUGH AND VIOLET P. CAVANAUGH 
GORDEN D. WALKER, COVECREST PROPERTIES 
$787,441.11 
NOVEMBER 2," 1987 
JANUARY 20, 1988 AS INSTRUMENT NO. 88-80842 
). OTHER MATTERS OF RECORD WHICH DO NOT DESCRIBE SAID LAND, BUT 
IICH, IF ANY EXIST, MAY AFFECT THE TITLE. THE NECESSARY SEARCH AND 
[AMINATION WILL BE COMPLETED WHEN A STATEMENT OF INFORMATION HAS 
!EN RECEIVED FROM RECORD OWNER OR OWNERS 
I POLICY WILL BE ISSUED UNDER THIS ORDER UNTIL WE ARE FURNISHED WITH 
ID STATEMENTS OF INFORMATION. PLEASE FORWARD AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO 
SIST IN THE EARLY CLEARANCE OF MATTERS OF RECORD AGAINST PERSONS WITH 
E SAME OR SIMILAR NAMES. 
SCRIPTION: 
TS 7 AND 8 IN BLOCK 5 OF G. W. MORGAN'S SYCAMORE GROVE TRACT, IN THE CITY OF 
S ANGELES, IN THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AS PER MAP 
:ORDED IN BOOK 11 PAGES 57 AND 58 OF MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS, IN THE OFFICE OF 
I COUNTY RECORDER OF SAID COUNTY. 
TLE OF THE VESTEE HEREIN WAS ACQUIRED BY DEED RECORDED: 
[OR TO SIX MONTHS FROM THE DATE HEREOF 
.ICY RATE: 100 PER CENT 
'23, DUP., PLATS 
ADDENDUM C PA11 9 
TICOR TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA 
.'40 ARTESIA BLVD., TORRANCE, CALIFORNIA 90504 TEL. (213) 542-0511 
ZNTION: 
~< NO.: 
NO. : 8544257 
LE OFFICER: D. MC CRADY 
ABOVE NUMBERED REPORT (INCLUDING ANY SUPPLEMENTS OR AMENDMENTS 
RETO) IS HEREBY MODIFIED AND/OR SUPPLEMENTED TO REFLECT THE 
LOWING ADDITIONAL ITEMS RELATING TO THE ISSUANCE OF AN AMERICAN 
D TITLE ASSOCIATION LOAN FORM POLICY AS FOLLOWS: 
A.L.T.A. INSPECTION DISCLOSES THE MATTERS LISTED BELOW: 
AN INVESTIGATION DISCLOSES IMPROVEMENTS ON SAID LAND, 
DESIGNATED AS: 
TYPE OF IMPROVEMENT: A SINGLE RESIDENCE 
STREET ADDRESS : 130 EAST AVENUE 42, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 
OUR A.L.T.A. LOAN POLICY, WHEN ISSUED, WILL CONTAIN C.L.T.A. 
DORSEMENT NO. 100. 
ADDENDUM C PA~E 10 
5 4 6 7 
SCAU r 
^ S I H H S S K S 
G. W. M O R G A N S SYCAMORE GROVE TRACT 
M.R. I I - 5 7 - 5 8 
IDAH_M. STROJ3RIDGE JRACT 
M. B. 8 - 7 
fC i r t t v ASSMT SfC 2 7 8 - 4 A 
iSSM 
COUNTY OF IC 
UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT 25-6-5 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS insolvency in the bankruptcy sense, as this sec-
tion requires merely a showing that the party's 
Allegation of insolvency.
 a g 8 e t 8 a r e nofc 8 u f f l c i e n t to m e e t l i a b i l i t i e 8 a s 
Determination of insolvency.
 t h e y b e c o m e d u e M e y e r y G e n e r f t l A m ^ ^ 
Allegation of insolvency. 569 P.2d 1094 (Utah 1977). 
Allegation of insolvency in a complaint in an In an action by a creditor to set aside an 
action to set aside a conveyance was sufficient allegedly fraudulent conveyance of real estate 
as against contention that it was a conclusion. by a debtor, the plaintiff did not demonstrate 
Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198,48 P.2d 513,101 that the debtor was insolvent where the only 
A.L.R. 532 (1935). evidence was that the debtor submitted two 
Determination of insolvency. checks that were returned unpaid. Furniture 
The determination of insolvency under this Mfrs. Sales, Inc. v. Deamer, 680 P.2d 398 
section is not the same as the determination of (Utah 1984). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Imputation of insolvency as de- Key Numbers. — Fraudulent Conveyances 
famatory, 49 A.L.R.3d 163. *=» 57(1). 
25-6-4. Value — Transfer. 
(1) Value is given for a transfer or an obligation if, in exchange for the 
transfer or obligation, property is transferred or an antecedent debt is secured 
or satisfied. However, value does not include an unperformed promise made 
other than in the ordinary course of the promisor's business to furnish support 
to the debtor or another person. 
(2) Under Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b) and Section 25-6-6, a person gives a rea-
sonably equivalent value if the person acquires an interest of the debtor in an 
asset pursuant to a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or exe-
cution of a power of sale for the acquisition or disposition of the interest of the 
debtor upon default under a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement. 
(3) A transfer is made for present value if the exchange between the debtor 
and the transferee is intended by them to be contemporaneous and is in fact 
substantially contemporaneous. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-4, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 
1988, ch. 59, § 4; recompiled as C. 1953, became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
25-6-4. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
25-6-5. Fraudulent transfer — Claim arising before or af-
ter transfer. 
(1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a 
creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was 
made or the obligation was incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or in-
curred the obligation: 
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the 
debtor; or 
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for 
the transfer or obligation; and the debtor: 
25 
25-6-5 FRAUD 
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transac-
tion for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably 
small in relation to the business or transaction; or 
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have be-
lieved that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they 
became due. 
(2) To determine "actual intent" under Subsection (l)(a), consideration may 
be given, among other factors, to whether: 
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider; 
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred 
after the transfer; 
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed; 
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor 
had been sued or threatened with suit; 
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets; 
(0 the debtor absconded; 
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets; 
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reason-
ably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the amount of the 
obligation incurred; 
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the trans-
fer was made or the obligation was incurred; 
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial 
debt was incurred; and 
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a 
lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor. 
History: C. 1953, 25A-1-5, enacted by L. 
1988, ch. 59, § 5; recompiled as C. 1953, 
25-6-5. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, Chapter 59 
ANALYSIS 
Assignments. 
Badges of fraud. 
Construction and application. 
Constructive trust. 
Conveyances between relatives. 
Evidence. 
Fair consideration. 
"Good faith" transfer. 
Mortgagor remaining in possession. 
Parent and child. 
Assignments. 
Rule that sale or assignment of chattels, un-
accompanied by change of possession, is fraud-
ulent per se as to execution creditors of, or sub-
sequent purchasers from, seller or assignor 
does not necessarily apply to assignments for 
benefit of creditors, but long delay in taking 
possession is circumstance from which fraud 
may be prima facie inferred. Snyder v. Mur-
dock, 20 Utah 419, 59 P 91 (1899). 
became effective on April 25,1988, pursuant to 
Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Cross-References. — Defrauding creditors 
as a misdemeanor, § 76-6-511. 
Whether an assignment of an interest in an 
estate was in good faith and not to hinder, de-
lay or defraud creditors, or was made for such 
purpose, depends upon the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the transaction, as gath-
ered from the badges of fraud present. 
Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 P.2d 1063 
(1942). 
Badges of fraud. 
Although actual fraudulent intent must be 
shown to hold a conveyance fraudulent, its ex-
istence may be inferred from the presence of 
certain indicia of fraud or "badges of fraud." 
Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726 P.2d 420 
(Utah 1986). 
"Badges of fraud," from which actual intent 
may be inferred, include, inter alia, a debtor's 
(1) continuing in possession and evidencing the 
prerequisites of property ownership after hav-
ing formally conveyed all his interest in the 
property, (2) making a conveyance in anticipa-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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